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WHEELDON v. BURROWS.
There will be no implied reservation of an easement, though it be a continuous
and apparent easement, unless it be also an easement of necessity.
A vendor having conveyed a plot of land, part of his property, to A., without
any reservation and subsequently another plot, part of the property retained and
adjoining the first plot, to B. ; upon B. clairiing in right of his plot a right of
light over A.'s plot, which, in the opinion of the court, was not an easement of
necessity ; Held, that though the easement claimed might be continuous and
apparent, yet, not being one of necessity, there was no implied reservation of it
by the vendor out of his conveyance to A., and B. was therefore not entitled to it.

THIS was an action whereby the plaintiff sought to restrain the
defendant from pulling down a boarding, which the plaintiff had
erected upon his own land, for the purpose of preventing the
defendant acquiring by prescription a right to light through the
windows of a wall belonging to the defendant, and which separated
the land of the defendant from that of the plaintiff. There was
no dispute as to the facts, and the plaintiff waived any claim for
damages by reason of the defendant's trespass. The only question
therefore remaining, was the question of law whether the defendant had or had not a right of light through the above-mentioned
windows over the plaintiff's land.
Thq facts will be found fully stated in the judgment of the ViceChancellor, who delivered a written judgment.
Horton Smith, Q. C., and Romer, for the plaintiff.-The vendor
conveyed our piece of land to us without any reservation of easements before the conveyance to the defendant, and therefore, on the
rule of law that a grantor cannot derogate from his own grant, no
right of light for the land of the vendor retained by him and the
shed built upon it was reserved. The fact that such an easement
as the right of light claimed in this case is an apparent and -ontinuous easement, does not cause an implied reservation of such
easement, except where the easement is one of necessity, which
the evidence shows this is not. Russell v. Harford, Law Rep.
2 Eq. 507 ; Gale on Easements, 4th ed., c. 4 ; Suffield v. Brown,
4 DeG., J. & S. 185; pyer v. Carter, 1 H. & N. 922; Tenant
v. aoldwin, 2 Ld. Raym. 1093, 1 Salk. 360; Palmer v. -Fletcher,
1 Lev. 122; White v. Bass, 7 H. & N. 722; Curriers' Co. v.
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Corbett, 2 Dr. & Sm. 355, 4 DeG., J. & S. 764, 771; Ellis v
Manchester Carriage Co., Law Rep. 2 0. P. D. 13; Crossley v.
Lightowler, Law Rep. 3 Eq. 279, 283, Law Rep. 2 Ch. 478;
Watts v. Kelson, Law Rep. 6 Ch. 166; Dodd v. Burchell, 1 H.
& 0. 118; Pearsonv. Spencer, 3 B. & S. 762; Morland v. Cook,
Law Rep. 6 Eq. 265.
Sir H H. Jackson, Q. 0., and P. IT Colt, for the defendant.The defendant is entitled to a right of light in respect of his shed,
for though there was no express reservation of easements by the vendor out of his conveyance to the plaintiff, this right of light is an
easement apparent and continuous, and is thus impliedly reserved
without express reservation.
_Pyer v. Carter; Wardle v. Brocklehurst, 1 E. & E. 1058 ; Gale on Easements, 4th ed., c. 4 ; Nich
olas v. Chamberlain, Cro. Jac. 121; Pinnington v. Galland, 9
Ex. 1; Richards v. Rose, 9 Id. 215; Kay v. Oxley, Law Rep.
10 Q. B. 360; Goddard on Easements 138; Swansborough v.
Coventry, 9 Bing. 305; Compton v. Richards, 1 Price 27 ; .Ewart
v. Coehrane, 4 Macq. 117 ; Dodd v. Burchell, 1 H. & C. 113;
Davies v. Sear, Law Rep. 7 Eq. 427; Hinchliffe v. Kinnoul, 5
Bing. N. C. 25; Dart's Vendor and Purchaser, 5th ed., p. 537.
Horton Smith, Q. 0., in reply.
BACON, V. (.-This action is brought by the plaintiff for the
purpose of restraining the defendant from repeating a trespass committed by him upon the plaintiff's land, the defendant insisting
that the alleged trespass had been merely the exercise of the right
possessed by him, to prevent the erection on the plaintiff's land of
any obstruction to the use of light through certain windows in a
tenement, belonging to the defendant and adjacent to and over
looking the plaintiff's land. [His lordship, after adverting to the
facts as regards the trespass, which he said was admittedly trivial,
and merely for the purpose of trying the right, continued:] The
question to be decided is therefore one of law only.
In 1856, one Allen became the absolute owner of a piece of land
in Derby, of which the portion now belonging to the plaintiff and
lying towards the north, was divided from the rest by a dry brick
wall. In 1858, Allen built upon the southern part of his land,
close to this wall, a shed or workshop, which was lighted only by
skylights. In 1861, Allen altered this shed, rebuilt and raised
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the wall belonging to it and also raised the roof, abolished the skylights, and inserted four windows in the wall which he had so
raised. Of these windows, one was afterwards covered by a workshop, built by Allen on that part of the land which has become the
plaintiff's, but there remained and still remain in the wall of the
shed built by Allen three windows, the subject of the present
action. Allen continued to use and occupy the whole of the prem
ises until 1867, when they were sold by him to one Woolley. In
1871, Woolley conveyed the premises to Tetley, who, in 1875,
caused them to be advertised for sale by public auction. The plaintiff's immediate predecessor became the purchaser at the auction
of lot 10, described in the printed particulars of sale as, "All that
valuable piece of eligible building land, containing, &c., and having a frontage and depth, &c., together with the building thereon,
now used and occupied by Mr. Win. Wheeldon (the plaintiff's predecessor in title), as a millwright's shop. This lot is suitable for
the erection of a factory or mill." By a deed dated the 6th of
January 1876, Tetley conveyed the land to Win. Wheeldon in fee,
by the description of "1All that piece or parcel of land or ground
containing by admeasurement 600 feet," &c., "together with the
buildings erected, on a part of the said piece of land and now used
or occupied as a millwright's shop, and which piece of land and
hereditaments are bounded towards the east, &c., towards the west,
&c., towards the north, &c., and on or towards the south, by other
hereditaments remaining the property of the said Samuel Tetley,
and which are now in the tenure or occupation of the said Win.
Wheeldon." Then came the usual general words, "Together with
all walls, fences, lights, watercourses," and so on. The premises,
now the property of the defendant, were thus described in the same
particulars of sale as, "All that valuable silk-mill, situate on Monk
street, consisting of a three-story mill, winding-room and other
rooms, and high pressure steam-engine, and an elastic web manufactory situate in the rear, the whole forming one of the most complete establishments in Derby; the mill and gimp-shed are at
present let. The whole machinery on this lot will be sold with the
freehold, particulars of which will be furnished." This lot was
bought in at the auction, and was afterwards purchased by private
contract by the defendant, to whom it was conveyed by Tetley, by
a conveyance dated the 7th of April 1871, by the description of
"All that silk-mill and factory," and so on, and the boundaries,

WHELDON v. BURROWS.

"on other part by a piece of land and hereditaments lately sold
and conveyed by the said Samuel Tetley to one Win. Wheeldon,
and on the south," by other premises, and so one; that clause contains the usual general words, among which are, "together with
all'houses, out-houses, gardens, passages, lights, waters, watercourses, privileges, emoluments and appurtenances whatsoever."
In January 1878, the plaintiff erected boardings near to the
edge of her land, and facing the three windows of the defendant's
shed, for the purpose of ascertaining her right to the uncontrolled
use and possession of the whole of her land. Immediately thereupon, the defendant knocked down those boardings by means of
crowbars or poles inserted through the windows of his wall. These
facts are all clearly proved or admitted.
Numerous authorities have been referred to on both sides, but
the principles of law insisted upon by the plaintiff are, that the
defendant's vendor, not being entitled to any prescriptive right to
the lights in question, and no mention having been made of them
in the conveyance to the plaintiff's predecessor in title, an absolute,
unqualified, unrestricted right to the land passes by the conveyance
to him; and that to hold the contrary would be repugnant to the
well-established principle of law, that a grantor cannot derogate
from his grant. The defendant, on the other hand, asserts and
insists that the three windows in question constituted a continuous
easement, and that it was open and notorious, and that although no
mention is made of it by way of reservation or otherwise in the
conveyance through which the plaintiff claims, it must in point of
law be held that a reservation of the vendor's rights to it must be
implied, and that such implication is as extensive and effectual as
if the reservation had been in terms and unequivocally expressed
in the conveyance under which the plaintiff claims. [His lordship
then remarked upon the number of cases cited and the differences
between them, and continued:] It is enough if a conclusive and
clear principle of law is deducible from them, and must be recognised in every case to which it is applicable. [His lordship then
referred to WFite v. .Bas8, and part of the judgment of Mr. Baron
MARTIN therein, as follows: "The plaintiff's counsel contends that
notwithstanding the grant of the land in the most general terms,
the purchasers are restricted in their use of it, so that they cannot
make any erection upon it, which obstructs the light and air of the
VoL. XXVII.-82
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plaintiff's house; I know of no authority for that position," and
continued:] In Suffield v. Brown, Lord WESTBURY in his judgment says: " The effect of this (that was the judgment appealed
from) is, that if I purchase from the owner of two adjoining freehold tenements, the fee-simple of one of them, and have it conveyed to me in the most ample and unqualified form, I am bound
to take notice of the manner in which the adjoining tenement is
used or enjoyed by my vendor, and to permit all such constant or
occasional invasions of the property conveyed as may be requisite
for the enjoyment of the remaining tenement in as full and ample
a manner as it was used and enjoyed by the vendor at the time of
such sale and conveyance. This is a very serious and alarming
doctrine ; and I believe it to be of very recent introduction, and it
is, in my judgment, unsupported by any reason or principle when
applied to grants for valuable consideration." T hen Lord WESTBURY'S attention seems to have been drawn to the passages to
which I have been referred in Gale on Easements, and he says:
"I cannot agree that a grantor can derogate from his own absolute
grant so as to claim rights over the thing granted, even if they
were at the time of the grant continuous and apparent easements,
enjoyed by an adjoining tenement, which remains the property of
him, the grantor." In the course of his judgment, Lord WESTBURY expressed his dissent from the judgment of the Court of
Exchequer in Pyer v. Carter; and the Lords Justices having, in a
subsequetit case of Watts v. KYelson, expressed a contrary opinion,
being satisfied with the decision in Pyer v. Carter,it has been
suggested that some doubt is thrown upon Lord WESTBURY's judgment in Suffield v. B~rown; but I think there is no ground for
such a suggestion, for whether Pyer v. Carterwas rightly decided
or not does not affect Lord WESTBURY'S decision in the case before
him. I am not under the necessity of expressing any opinion on
the subject; but Lord CHELMSFORD, in Crossley v. Lightowler
speaking of Lord WESTBURY'S view of Pqer v. Carter, said, "I
entirely agree with this view," and further, "It appears to me to
be an immaterial circumstance that the easement should be apparent and continuous, for non constat that the grantor does not intend
to relinquish it, unless he shows the contrary by expressly reserving it. The argument of the defendants would make in every case
of this kind, an implied reservation by law, and yet the law will
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not reserve anything out of a grant in favor of a grantor except
in case of necessity."
That seems clearly to be the law, though Lord CHELMSFORD in
that case, says, if carried to excess it would produce great and
startling injustice. [His lordship then referred to .Ellis v. Manchester Carriage Co., which followed the cases he had previously
referred to, and continued:] Now, this being the state of the law,
the defendants have relied upon the case of Pyer v. Carter,and
several other cases, as showing that with respect to continuous
easements, the absence of any mention in the conveyance of any
reservation is not inconsistent with a reservation by implication ;
but all the cases in which a reservation has been implied, are cases
in which the necessity of the case required such an implication.
Why ? Because the thing sold and conveyed could not be enjoyed
by the grantee in the manner and to the extent which it was
plainly by both parties intended that it should be, unless such
implication were made. I take it that the rule of implication is
founded upon the mere necessity of the case and the impossibility
of admitting that the contract, and the intention of the parties to
it would be complete without the implication. The subject of the
implication is held to have been involved in the terms of the contract, and the justice and honesty .of the transaction require that
the law should supply that, which by the inadvertence of the parties, has not been expressed in words. Upon this principle every
one of the cases referred to is founded and all are reconcilable,
and no case has been cited, nor do I believe that any can be found
in which an implication has been made not based upon necessity
and the justice that necessity imperatively calls into active operation. It cannot, I think, be said that any such necessity exists in
the present case as renders it expedient or proper that the vendor
of lot 6 should reserve to himself any right in lot 10 which would
exclude or restrict the grantee of lot 6 from using and enjoying it
without qualification or restriction. It was not necessary that the
windows in the shed should exist; it is not suggested that there
is any particular manufacture carried on in the shed, or that any
peculiar position of windows or condition of the light are requisite
for the full enjoyment by the vendor of that portion of his property, which he retained after he conveyed the land to the plaintiff
without reservation. Windows might have been inserted by the
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vendor on the other side of his shed, or he might have reverted to
his former contrivance of lighting it by skylights.
The plaintiff is therefore entitled to his injunction.
How generally the American courts
deny the acquisition of a right to light
and air by prescription, its allowed in
England, was shown in the note to
Stein v. Hauck, 17 Am. Law Reg. 440,
but on the point involved in Wheeldon v.
Burroughs, they are much divided. Four
different views seem to prevail. The
first is that upon the severance of a tenement, a right to light and air is generally iniplied in favor of the grantee over
the remaining land of the grantor, and
apparently without reference to the
question of its actual necessity for the
full enjoyment of the estate granted.
The second is that such right is implied
only when it is actually necessary, and
not where it is only convenient, though
highly so, to the purchaser. Third, that
such right is never implied, however
necessary to the enjoyment of the estate
purchased. Fourth, that such right is
never impliedly reserved in favor of a
grantor, as against an absolute and
unconditional grantee, free from encumbrances, even if under similar circumstances it might be implied in favor of
a grantee against his grantor.
1. The right is implied whether necessary to the estate or not.
The earliest reported case on this
point is Story v. Odin, 12 Mass. 157,
which, though subsequently shaken if
not overruled in its own state, has yet
been so often approved and followed
elsewhere, that an impartial consideration of the authorities seems to require
its citation as a leading case on this side
of the question.
In that case Story bought, in 1795, a
lot of land of the town of Boston situated in Dock square, with a store upon
it, having a door and two or three
windows looking out over the adjacent
vacant lot also owned by the town, and

which the town subsequently, in 1812,
sold to Odin, who erected a building
upon it, covering the whole ground, and
adjoining the back wall of the store,
and thus obstructed the light and air
thereto. The deed to S. was with all the
privileges and appurtenances, and without any exception or reservation of a
right to build on the adjoining lot, or
to stop the lights in the store so sold.
It was held to be "clear that the grantors themselves could not afterwards
lawfully stop those lights, and thus
defeat or impair their own grant; and
as they could not do this themselves, so
neither could they convey a right to do
it to a stranger." And a verdict for S.
was sustained.
This case has not only been often
cited with apparent approbation in the
same state (see 17 Mass. 448), but also
by such distinguished judges elsewhere,
as STORY, SfLDEe and others. See
1 Sumn. 503; 21 N. Y. 513.
Next after Story v. Odin, and much
relying upon it, came Robeson v. Pittenger, I Green's Ch. Rep. 57, in the
Court of Chancery of New Jersey, in
1838. There S. owning two lots, built
a dwelling-house on one "immediately
on the line of" the other, with six
windows, which opened and received
light and air from the other. The house
came into the possession of the plaintiff,
and the other lot into that of the defendant, who purposed to erect a building
thereon which would darken the plaintiff's windows. The plaintiff obtained
an injunction against the same, partly
upon the ground that the windows had
existed for more than twenty years, and
partly because "the adjoining lot was
owned by the man who built the house
and subsequently sold it to the plaintiff. ,"
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But the most direct, and apparently
the best considered recent American
authority upon this side of the question
is that of Janes v. Jenkins, 34 Md. 1
(1870). In this case A., the owner of
two adjoining lots, called the east and
west lots, leased the east lot for ninetynine years, with a covenant that the
lessee might make openings, and place
lights in the wall which he contemplated
erecting on the west line of said lot.
The wall was erected and lights placed
in it overlooking the west lot, which A.
subsequently conveyed to B. Subsequently to the erection of the wall, and
the last deed to B., A. sold the east lot
to C., by a deed containing this clause :
with, "all and every the rights, alleys,
ways, waters, privileges, appurtenances
and advantages to the same belonging,
or in any wise appertaining." The deed
of the west lot to B. contained a special
covenant of warranty, and in an action
thereon for an alleged breach by reason
of the existence of the wall on the east
lot, overlooking the other, whereby the
grantee was prevented from building on
the same, it was clearly held that the
owner of the east lot had acquired by
his grant a right to maintain the wall
and windows, and overlook the other
lot, and the case of Story v. Odin, was
cited and approved. Perhaps the peculiar phraseology of the grant in this
case may have aided in arriving at the
conclusion, but the court seems to fully
adopt the broad English doctrine.
The English rule seems also to prevail in Louisiana : Dazel v. Boisblanc,
1 La. Ann. 407 (1846) ; but this may
be expressly secured by the civil code,
there prevailing. See especially Articles 707, 711, 712, 713.
2. The second view is that such implied grant exists, where the existing
light and air is substantially necessary
for the enjoyment of the house or building conveyed, but not where it is only
convenient.
On this subject Judge WASHBURN,

after a review of several authorities,
says (Wash. on Easements, c. iv., sect.
6, p. 618) : " So far as weight of authority, both English and American,
goes, it would seem that if one sell a
house, the light necessary for the reasonable enjoyment whereof is derived from
and across adjoining land, then belonging to the same owner, the casement
of light and air over such vacant lot
would pass as incident to the dwellinghouse, because necessary to the enjoyment
thereof; but that the law would not
carry the doctrine to the securing of
such easement, as a mere convenience
to the granted premises."
It may be that the above is a just and
reasonable rule to prevail, but it is not
easy to see that it is positively determined by the authorities referred to by
the learned author. It has, however,
some supposed analogies to support it,
and it has recently been cited and approved in several cases. It was quoted
with approbation in Turnerv. Thompson,
58 Ga. 268 (1877), although that state
denies the doctrine of any prescriptive
right to light and air; 49 Ga. 19.
So, in Powell v. Sims, 5 West Va. 1
(1871), it was held that an implied
grant of an easement of lights will be
sustained only in cases of real and
obvious necessity; and will be rejected
when the person claiming the same can,
at a reasonable cost, substitute other
lights to his building; each case being
determined on its own facts as to the
degree of necessity requisite for a foundation of the rights.
In like manner in White v. Bradley,
66 Me. 263 (1876), it seems to be
impliedly admitted that there may be
cases falling under Judge WAsnBuRN's
rule of necessity, though that particular
case was decided against the right, on
the ground that it was a "mere convenience" to the granted premises.
3. The right is never implied. There
is certainly some room for argument
that if light is absolutely necessary
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to enjoy the estate granted, a right to
its free passage might be implied, in
the same manner as a right of way
arises where no other means of access
exist to the estate conveyed ; but the
current of modern authorities seems to
set against applying the analogy to
light and air ; especially in those states
which repudiate the English doctrine
of a prescriptive right of light.
One of the most striking illustrations
of this view may be found in the recent
elaborately considered case of Keats v.
The
Hugo, 115 Mass. 204 (1874).
defendant had sold the plaintiff a dwelling-house, by a warranty-deed, with all
the "privileges and appurtenances."
The house stood on the line adjoining
other vacant land of the defendant,
with a door and windows in that side.
After the conveyance the defendant
erected a structure and woodshed on his
vacant lot against the dwelling-house,
and within about eight inches of the same.
The plaintiff brought an action for
obstructing his right to light and air,
and the question of an implied grant
was the only point involved in the case.
Two other cases involving similar questions between other parties were also
argued by eminent counsel, and the
whole were carefully considered together, and the same result reached in
each by the whole court. Chief Justice
GRAY, in an elaborate review of the
authorities, establishes, first, that in that
state no right of light and air could
be obtained by prescription ; and second,
that the same considerations lead to the
position that the doctrine of implied
grant (which is there recognis.ed in
some other easements), does not apply
to this claim. " By nature," he says,
" light and air do not flow in definite
channels, but are universally diffused.
The supposed necessity for their passage in a particular line or direction to
any lot of land, is created not by the
relative situation of that lot to the surrounding lands, but by the manner in

which that lot has been built upon.
Tie actual enjoyment of the air and
light by the owner of the house is upon
his own land only. He makes no tangible or visible use of the adjoining
lands, nor indeed any use of them,
which can he made the subject of an
action by their owner, or which in any

way interferes with the latter's enjoyment of the light and air upon his own
lands, or with any use of those lands
in their existing condition. In short,
the owner of the adjoining lands has
submitted to nothing which actually encroached upon his rights, and cannot,
therefore, be presumed to have assented
to any such encroachment. The use
and enjoyment of the adjoining land are
certainly no more subordinate to those
of the house where both are owned by
one man, than where the owners are
different. The reasons upon which it
has been held that no grant of a right
to air and light can be implied from
any length of continuous enjoyment,
are equally strong against implying a
grant of such a right from the mere
conveyance of a house with windows
overlooking the house of the grantor.
To imply the grant of such a right in
either case, without express words,
would greatly embarrass the improvement of estates, and by reason of the
very indefinite character of the right
asserted, promote litigation. The simplest rule, and that best suited to a
country like ours, in which changes
are continually taking place in the
ownership and the use of lands, is that
no right of this character can be acquired without express grant of an
interest in or covenant relating to, the
lands over which the right is claimed."
Story v. Odin was criticised and
distinguished but was not expressly declared to be overruled, as apparently it
might safely have been.
The courts of New York also deny the
doctrine of an implied grant, especially
between lessor and lessee; and they
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allow a landlord who owns land adjoining the demi-ed premises to build upon

it, even though thereby he seriously
darkens the light in the buildings leased.
Pabnerv.lt'tn, re, 2 Sandf. 316 (1849);
Mj4ers v. Geinmel, 10 Barb. 537 (1851)
and Ohio is to the same effect; Mullen
v. Stricker, 19 Ohio St. 135 (1869);
even if the use of the windows be actually necessary for the estate granted ;
and Pennsylvania inz!ines the same way:
fzynazrd v. Esler, 17 Penn. St. 222
33 Id. 371. Indiana, in
(1851);
K,iferv. Kldn, 51 Ind. 316 (1875),
in an elaborate opinion, adopted the
same rule.
4. Even if the doctrine of an implied
grant be applied in favor of a grantee
there is much less reason to apply it in
favor of the grantor, and it may be
safely asserted that nowhere, in England
or America, can a grantor who has
sold a vacant lot without restriction or
reservation, having his dwelling-house
adjoining, retain any implied right to
prevent his grantee from erecting any
building or structureon the land granted,
even though it should interfere with
lights and windows of his own house.
The contrary rule would clearly derogate from his grant, since he conveys
a fee unrestricted, and cius est solum
jus est ad cduni.
This was the point really involved in
the elaborate and well-considered case
of Jforrison Y. Jfarquardt, 7 Am. Law
Reg. N. S. 336; 24 Iowa 35 (1867),
although the court inclined to apply
the same rule conversely, certainly unless it be clear from the deed that the
parties intended differently.
And this is undoubtedly the English
law ; the grantee in the case of an absolute conveyance has a right to use
the land in any lawful way, for if the
grantor fear an injury to his lights and

air, he should make a restriction in the
deed of conveyance : Tenant v. Goodwin,
2 Ld. Raym. 1893, Ld. HoLt ; White v.
Bass, 7 H. & X. 722 (1862). Curriers'
Co. v. Corbett, 2 Dr. &Sin. 355 (1865).

This point was more fusly considered
in the late case of Ellis v. The Manchester Carriage Co., 2 C. P. Div. 13
(1876). There the plaintiff, in 1867,
bought nine houses in Manchester, the
rear of which abutted on a street or way,
on the opposite side of which were
certain cottages. In 1868, he bought
the cottages also, but by a different title.
Both estates had existed in their then
condition for over twenty years. In 1870
the plaintiff sold the cottages to D.,
without any reservation, who afterwards
conveyed to the defendants ; they pulled
down the cottages and erected a large
building upon the site, and also upon a
portion of the intervening street or way,
and so obstructed the plaintiff'swindows.
It was held, that although the plaintiff's
-houses had acquired an " absolute and
indefeasible," right to light, under stat.
2 & 3 Win. 4, c. 71, s. 3, the defendants were not guilty of any wrongful
obstruction of the plaintiff's lights, since
his own deed to D. was without any reservation. And see W1'arner v. McBride,
36 Law T. 360 (1877).
Hence it will be seen that although
in cases of some easements, such as a
right of way, an implied reservation
exists in favor of the grantor over or
upon the land granted, especially when
reasonably necessary for the use of the
estate retained ; this doctrine is not
applied to an easement of light and air
even by those courts which, as in England, most firmly support such right in
favor of a grantee against his grantor,
under like circumstances.
EDMUND H. BENNETr.

